Citing the convergence of two records - the length of OEF and the relatively small percentage of the population serving in the military - Paul Taylor, editor of the Pew Research Center's study, "War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era," said he wanted to investigate this unique period in US history. "We've never had sustained combat for a full decade, and we've never fought a war in which such a small share of the population has carried the fight."
Citing results of the study, Taylor observed, "there is a gap. Whether or not this is a good or bad thing is in effect, frankly, above my pay grade. It's an interesting question."
Read the article here.
Review the Pew study here.
Showing posts with label OIF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OIF. Show all posts
Thursday, October 6, 2011
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Recap – Lessons 5-6
We looked at the arguments made to justify the invasion of Iraq with an eye toward whether or not they were good, i.e., persuasive. That led to a discussion about what happens when a military officer disagrees with the stated policy of our civilian leadership and the decisions of our Commander-in-Chief. Pretty clear consensus that once those decisions are enacted in the form of directives from senior military leadership, we either follow orders or resign. Then we took it a step further: what about those officers who stay and obey yet still disagree? Do they get to state their opinion – privately – to family, friends, or subordinates? Mixed feelings on this, with many of you thinking we should suppress our opinions and toe the line, period-dot. Others observed we can’t help but form opinions, and suppressing them when someone asks would be tantamount to BS. In both cases, the effect on the morale of our subordinates was the primary motivator: toe the line so as not to discourage our Airmen, vs. be honest, because our Airmen will recognize BS.
Following Martin Cook’s comparison of two superpowers – the United States after the Cold War and ancient Athens after the Persian Wars – we explored some analogues between the Peloponnesian War and OIF. We looked at the difference between preemptive and preventive justifications for going to war (jus ad bellum), at the types of coalitions each conflict spawned, and at the harsh realism of the Athenians vs. the false dilemma embedded in our own policy, both of which resulted in a “with us or against us” stance toward other nations.
We also talked about the effects of war. For Athens, the Peloponnesian War ushered in the end of her domination of the Greeks, the “brief, shining moment” that marked the beginning of Western culture. The effect of OIF on the U.S. is still unwritten. As Secretary Gates recently told reporters, “the problem with this war for, I think, many Americans is that the premise on which we justified going to war proved not to be valid — that is, Saddam having weapons of mass destruction.” He added, candidly: “It will always be clouded by how it began.”
History will clarify what good comes out of OIF. From the Peloponnesian War, one positive outcome we identified was the re-focusing of philosophy into ethical realms of inquiry. Philosophy had already existed in an early form prior to the war. Its path out of the ancient Greek religion, what we now call mythology, appears when the earliest philosophers, the pre-Socratics, sought naturalistic explanations for life’s everyday challenges. They formed explanations based on their observations of nature, as opposed to relying on the presence of gods and the gods’ interaction with humanity to explain how and why the world worked. Even then, the pre-Socratics couldn’t wholly escape the religious context of their time, and many of their explanations retained mythic qualities. It wasn’t until Socrates developed his style of street philosophy that the ancient, mythopoeic ethic (based on punishment and reward) would begin to be challenged.
Following Martin Cook’s comparison of two superpowers – the United States after the Cold War and ancient Athens after the Persian Wars – we explored some analogues between the Peloponnesian War and OIF. We looked at the difference between preemptive and preventive justifications for going to war (jus ad bellum), at the types of coalitions each conflict spawned, and at the harsh realism of the Athenians vs. the false dilemma embedded in our own policy, both of which resulted in a “with us or against us” stance toward other nations.
We also talked about the effects of war. For Athens, the Peloponnesian War ushered in the end of her domination of the Greeks, the “brief, shining moment” that marked the beginning of Western culture. The effect of OIF on the U.S. is still unwritten. As Secretary Gates recently told reporters, “the problem with this war for, I think, many Americans is that the premise on which we justified going to war proved not to be valid — that is, Saddam having weapons of mass destruction.” He added, candidly: “It will always be clouded by how it began.”
History will clarify what good comes out of OIF. From the Peloponnesian War, one positive outcome we identified was the re-focusing of philosophy into ethical realms of inquiry. Philosophy had already existed in an early form prior to the war. Its path out of the ancient Greek religion, what we now call mythology, appears when the earliest philosophers, the pre-Socratics, sought naturalistic explanations for life’s everyday challenges. They formed explanations based on their observations of nature, as opposed to relying on the presence of gods and the gods’ interaction with humanity to explain how and why the world worked. Even then, the pre-Socratics couldn’t wholly escape the religious context of their time, and many of their explanations retained mythic qualities. It wasn’t until Socrates developed his style of street philosophy that the ancient, mythopoeic ethic (based on punishment and reward) would begin to be challenged.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
Recap: Lessons 1-4
We started with basic terms, Philosophy, Ethics and Morality, and we made a distinction between Ethics and Morality for the purpose of this course. Remember, most people use the terms Ethics and Morality interchangeably (though they wouldn’t say something like “business morality” or “the ethic of the story”). We make the distinction here because (1) the words have seperate roots and origins, and (2) when we look at the etymology, we find that ancient difference informs an important feature of your relationship to the Academy.
It goes something like this: You come here with an established set of morals. The job here at the Academy is to present to you our military ethic. Your job then is (1) to decide whether you want to be a part of the military, and (2) to adopt the military ethos. We all operate under the assumption that the answer to (1) is “yes,” so the real work is going on with (2). Adopting the military ethos is a process, not something you do overnight. Throughout that process, we, the faculty, staff and personnel at the Academy, work to reinforce your decision in various ways. Ultimately, we’re working to persuade you to adopt our ethos. That may sound strange at first, but much of human communication and interaction amounts to little more than some function of persuasion. In class I said philosophers have two main tasks; to analyze and to persuade. The same could be said for any academic field. Science, for instance, does the majority of its business behind the scenes, with scientists working to persuade one another about what constitutes evidence. In the Air Force, our “official” (i.e., the one we learn in PME) definition of leadership is “the art and science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the assigned mission.” Sometimes the best way to persuade someone is to have them persuade themselves, so your fist assignment for the course, reading George F. Will’s lecture and answering the two questions, was designed to have you reflect on your own process of internalizing the military ethos up to this point.
We talked in class about how persuasion moves one to adopt a belief or position or course of action and how it’s based on argument. We looked at the construction of arguments and the different types, how our experience of the world is matured through argument, and how we judge good arguments from the bad ones, which is the critical step in developing our knowledge. On that last point, the Harry Frankfurt reading took us beyond fallacies with his work on BS. We read him as an exemplar of how philosophers do their work. His examinations of lying and intent are also applicable to your experience with the Honor Code here at the Academy. Your second assignment will explore that further and consider whether Frankfurt might offer some enhancement to the Code and its application.
Finally, we applied some tools of the trade to a case study by taking a critical look at the justifications for going to war in Iraq and identifying the bad arguments, i.e., those that failed to persuade.
It goes something like this: You come here with an established set of morals. The job here at the Academy is to present to you our military ethic. Your job then is (1) to decide whether you want to be a part of the military, and (2) to adopt the military ethos. We all operate under the assumption that the answer to (1) is “yes,” so the real work is going on with (2). Adopting the military ethos is a process, not something you do overnight. Throughout that process, we, the faculty, staff and personnel at the Academy, work to reinforce your decision in various ways. Ultimately, we’re working to persuade you to adopt our ethos. That may sound strange at first, but much of human communication and interaction amounts to little more than some function of persuasion. In class I said philosophers have two main tasks; to analyze and to persuade. The same could be said for any academic field. Science, for instance, does the majority of its business behind the scenes, with scientists working to persuade one another about what constitutes evidence. In the Air Force, our “official” (i.e., the one we learn in PME) definition of leadership is “the art and science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the assigned mission.” Sometimes the best way to persuade someone is to have them persuade themselves, so your fist assignment for the course, reading George F. Will’s lecture and answering the two questions, was designed to have you reflect on your own process of internalizing the military ethos up to this point.
We talked in class about how persuasion moves one to adopt a belief or position or course of action and how it’s based on argument. We looked at the construction of arguments and the different types, how our experience of the world is matured through argument, and how we judge good arguments from the bad ones, which is the critical step in developing our knowledge. On that last point, the Harry Frankfurt reading took us beyond fallacies with his work on BS. We read him as an exemplar of how philosophers do their work. His examinations of lying and intent are also applicable to your experience with the Honor Code here at the Academy. Your second assignment will explore that further and consider whether Frankfurt might offer some enhancement to the Code and its application.
Finally, we applied some tools of the trade to a case study by taking a critical look at the justifications for going to war in Iraq and identifying the bad arguments, i.e., those that failed to persuade.
Friday, August 13, 2010
"Leading to War"
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